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can speak of the emergence of novelty in descriptions of a higher level" (Primas 1998, p. 86) .
Following Primas' ideas, Robert Bishop (2005) also considers the limitations of quantum mechanics to account for molecular structure, and points out that proper attention to the context relevant to a particular situation can resolve otherwise intractable problems (see also Bishop and Atmanspacher 2006) .
Robin Hendry (2004 Hendry ( , 2008 Hendry ( , 2010 has largely treated the issue of molecular structure in the context of the problem of reduction. He clearly distinguishes between the intertheoretic and the metaphysical aspects of the reduction debate. In fact, reductionists and non-reductionists agree that classical intertheoretic reductions of chemistry are not currently available, but differ in how they interpret the situation: "the issue is essentially future directed both sides must wait and see, even if they would bet different ways. But why do the two sides make different bets?
Perhaps the answer concerns their different underlying metaphysical views." (Hendry 2010, p. 184) . On this basis, Hendry considers that the reduction debate must turn to consider the ontological relationships between the entities, processes, and laws studied by different sciences.
In particular, the relationship between quantum mechanics and molecular chemistry, embodied in the way in which the molecular structure of a system of several electrons and nuclei is explained, must be conceived in terms of emergence.
Summing up, the claim that molecular structure cannot be reduced to quantum mechanics is not new. Different chemical examples are appealed to for supporting it. The case of optical isomerism is perhaps the clearest challenge to a reductive stance: "the existence of isomers, and the very idea of molecular structure that rationalizes it, remains a central problem for chemical physics." (Woolley 1998, p. 3) . Friedrich Hund's "paradox" expresses that central problem:
given that the chiral states are not eigenstates of the parity-invariant Hamiltonian, and none of them corresponds to the basal state, why certain chiral molecules display an optical activity that is stable in time, associated to a well-defined chiral state, and they are not in a superposition of the two possible chiral states? (Hund 1927) . During the last decades, Hund's paradox was formulated in a slightly stronger version (Berlin, Burin and Goldanskii 1996) : how can chiral molecules exist?
The problem of isomerism is a particular case of what can be called, following Woolley and Sutcliffe (1977) , the symmetry problem: if the interactions embodied in the Hamiltonian of the molecule are Coulombic, the solutions of the Schrödinger equation are spherically 4 symmetrical; however, the asymmetry of polyatomic molecules is essential in the explanation of their chemical behavior. As Hendry (1998) (Hendry 2010, p. 186) .
The traditional strategy underlying these arguments is to consider chemical cases that challenge the reducibility of molecular structure to quantum mechanics. Instead of taking that top-down strategy, in this paper we will adopt a bottom-up argumentation: if the problems are consequences of the foundational incompatibility between quantum systems and molecular systems, it is worth considering in detail the conceptual features of quantum mechanics that obstruct reduction. For this purpose, in Section 2 we will recall the contextuality of quantum mechanics, which challenge the category of individual for quantum systems. On this basis, in Section 3 we will show how the individuality of quantum particles gets lost even in the simplest system: the hydrogen atom. Section 4 will be devoted to develop an analysis of certain assumptions that, although adopted acritically in quantum chemistry, are highly conflictive from the quantum perspective. In Section 5 we will discuss what kind of approximation is the BornOppenheimer approximation, stressing in what sense it involves a conceptual breakdown regarding the underlying domain. Finally, in the Conclusions we will review how the peculiar features of quantum mechanics are foundational obstacles to the reduction of molecular structure, and we will consider the possible ways out of this conceptual situation.
2.-The nature of the quantum object
Let us begin by recalling the traditional formalism of quantum mechanics in the Dirac-von Neumann version (Dirac 1030 , von Neumann 1932 () vx that represents the components of the vector. This allows to conceive functions as vectors, and to use the powerful mathematical apparatus developed in vector algebra. Now we can recall the model of the free particle studied in the first courses of quantum mechanics. The quantum free particle is represented by a wavepacket whose square represents the probability of finding the particle at each position. Although the wavepacket may be highly peaked in one point, it has a non-zero value in all space. Moreover, according the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, the product of the standard deviations of position and of momentum (by 6 considering the wavefunction in the momentum representation), q  and p  , are bounded by a constant value:
The very name of the Heisenberg principle, 'uncertainty principle', suggests an epistemic reading of its content: the particle is in some determinate position, but we do not know which one. The limitation is viewed as merely predictive: "if the momentum is specified precisely, it is impossible to predict the location of the particle" (Atkins and de Paula 2010, p. 276) . This reading was already implicit in the so called "Heisenberg microscope", a thought experiment proposed by Werner Heisenberg (1930) , according to which the measurement of the position of the particle disturbs its momentum and vice versa. Although non-commutativity is a much deeper feature than mere epistemic uncertainty, somebody might still believe that the impossibility of ascribing simultaneously precise values to incompatible observables is a limitation of the laws of quantum mechanics itself, which could be remediated by adding the necessary complements to the theory. This was Einstein's original idea when, in his paper on non-locality (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935) , presented an argument precisely designed to prove the incompleteness of quantum mechanics. This gave rise to the hope of completing the theory with some kind of "hidden variables", which would assign 7 definite values to all the observables of a quantum system. But in 1967, Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker (1967) presented a fundamental theorem that proves, in the context of the Hilbert space formalism, that any assignment of a definite value to all the observables of a quantum system leads to contradiction. In other words, the Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates that quantum mechanics is essentially contextual: definite values can be consistently assigned only in a context, that is, to observables that share the same eigenbasis.
The contextuality of quantum mechanics shows that it is not the case that the quantum system has definite properties but we do not know which; in fact, any non-contextual attempt to complete the assignment of properties, no matter how, leads to contradiction. It is not the case that the particle has a definite momentum but we do not know its position: any assignment of a definite position and a definite position is logically forbidden by the very structure of the theory.
Therefore, quantum mechanics challenges the traditional principle of omnimode determination, "quodlibet existens est omnimode determinatum", that appears in the works of Wolff (1728) , in the famous treatise on the calculus of probabilities by Bernoulli (1713) , and is also repeated several times by Kant in his lectures on metaphysics dating from the 1760s to the 1790s (see the edition of 1902). A quantum "particle" is not an individual in the traditional sense, since it has properties those represented by its observables that have no definite value; and this is not a merely epistemic limitation, but an ontological fact described by the theory. As we will see in the next section, this feature of quantum mechanics is not a mere philosophical curiosity, but has specific manifestations in physical models.
3.-The components of the hydrogen atom
In the discussions about molecular structure, reductionists usually rely on the complexity of the molecules and the insolubility of exact equations. However, the idea of molecules whose structure is given by certain individual objects, the nuclei, approximately localized and spatially related with each other is untenable, not because of mathematical intractability, but due to the conceptual breakdown regarding the very concept of individual in the quantum realm. And this breakdown is manifested even by the simplest system, whose equation has a complete analytical solution: the hydrogen atom.
Let us begin by recalling that the symmetry group of quantum mechanics is the Galilean group, a Lie group defined by ten symmetry generators that represent the basic magnitudes of 8 the theory: the energy H representing time-displacement, the three momentum components i P representing space-displacements, the three angular momentum components i J representing space-rotations, and the three components i G representing velocity-boosts (see Lévy-Leblond 1963 , Ballentine 1998 Beyond the mathematical definition of a group, it is important to stress the physical meaning of a symmetry transformation. A continuous transformation, as in the case of those belonging to the Galilean group, admits two interpretations. Under the active interpretation, the transformation corresponds to a change from a system to another transformed system; under the passive interpretation, the transformation consists in a change of the viewpoint the reference frame from which the system is described (see Brading and Castellani 2007) .
Nevertheless, in both cases the invariance of the fundamental law of a theory under its symmetry group implies that the behavior of the system is not altered by the application of the transformations: in the active interpretation language, the original and the transformed systems are equivalent; in the passive interpretation language, the original and the transformed reference frames are equivalent.
From the viewpoint of the passive interpretation, the invariance of the dynamical laws under the Galilean group amounts to the equivalence among inertial reference frames (timetranslated, space-translated, space-rotated or uniformly moving with respect to each other). In other words, Galilean transformations do not introduce a modification in the physical situation, but only amount to a change in the perspective from which the system is described. 
where e is the electric charge of the electron, and the subscripts e and p refer to the electron and the proton respectively. Of course, we can operate with this Hamiltonian to solve the timeindependent Schrödinger equation as usual. But if we want to know which are the objective magnitudes of the system, we have to rewrite the Hamiltonian of eq. (5) under the form
H K W
, where K is the kinetic energy and W is the internal energy. Since the value of the kinetic energy K is modified by a boost, K is a non-objective magnitude that changes with the mere change of the descriptive perspective. In particular, when the system is described in the reference frame at rest with respect to its center of mass, then 0  P and the kinetic energy disappear from the description. This agrees with the fact that energy is defined up to a constant value: the objective information about the energy spectrum of the system is contained in its internal energy W , which is a Casimir operator of the Galilean group and, therefore, is invariant under all its transformations.
In order to express the Hamiltonian under the form H K W , it is necessary to introduce a change of variables in terms of the center of mass coordinates and the relative coordinates: Up to this point this seems a mere change of variables, as those used in classical mechanics. But now the specifically quantum feature appears. The kinetic energy K only depends on the total momentum relative to RF , and the internal energy W does not depend on the position and the momentum relative to RF , but only depends on differences of positions and, eventually, on their derivatives. (Ardenghi, Castagnino and Lombardi 2009 ). This means that, after the interaction between the electron and the proton, the hydrogen atom becomes a composite system, but not composed of the electron and the proton: now the subsystems are a system W represented by the Hilbert space W , and a system K represented by the Hilbert space K H . And in the objective (invariant under the Galilean group) system W , electron and proton are no longer recognizable, but are inextricably "mixed" to constitute a new entity.
In summary, when a classical or quantum composite system is described in the reference frame of its center of mass, in both cases its internal energy is represented by a Casimir operator of the Galilean group and, since invariant under all the transformations of the group, the internal energy is an objective property of the composite system. However, this agreement does not undermine the deep difference between the two cases. In the classical case, the component particles can be reidentified in the composite system: they are individuals whose identity can be traced off through their trajectories even after the interaction. In the quantum case, on the contrary, there are no trajectories that identify each particle as an individual different from the others, since contextuality prevents them to simultaneously have definite values of position and momentum. Therefore, quantum systems are identified by the structure of properties represented in a given Hilbert space. But in a quantum composite system, the internal energy is an objective property corresponding to a single Hilbert space, indecomposable into the Hilbert spaces of 11 component systems. In other words, the objective description of a quantum composite system shows that it can no longer be analyzed in terms of the quantum systems that existed before the interaction: after the interaction, a quantum "composite" system is not really composite since it does not have objective components. This result agrees with the conclusion of the previous section: quantum "particles" are not individuals in the traditional sense. The category of individual requires some "principle of individuality" that makes an individual different than other individuals and that re-identifies it through time (French and Krause 2006) . Quantum "particles", by contrast, do not preserve their identity after interaction, and this does not depend on the complexity of the system, but on the very nature of quantum mechanics.
4.-Why the basis of the energy?
As stressed above, a quantum system is represented by a Hilbert space . In this vector space, all the bases are equivalent: there is no theoretical reason to prefer a basis over the others.
However, chemistry always works in the basis of the energy: the interest is always focused on the possible values of the energy and the possible eigenstates of the Hamiltonian. Why?
Another way of stressing this point is to notice that it is usual to talk about the timeindependent Schrödinger equation:
Thus, the Hamiltonian seems to have a privilege in the description of molecules not only regarding their dynamics, but also synchronically, since it is contained in a "time-independent law". However, in the context of quantum mechanics, the Schrödinger equation is the dynamical postulate of the theory, that is, the law that rules the time evolution of the system. Therefore, talking of a dynamical postulate that is "independent of time" sounds, at least, strange from a physical viewpoint. Strictly speaking, eq. (11) is not a time-independent law, but the eigenstate- The eigenstate-eigenvalue link supplies an adequate answer in this case and accounts for many situations encountered in practice. However, it does not always work as well as one would expect: its shortcomings come to the light already in the simplest atomic model: the free hydrogen atom (see Lombardi and Castagnino 2010) . As it is well known, the principal quantum number n , the orbital angular momentum quantum number l and the magnetic quantum These arguments show that the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, with its clamped nuclear assumption, is not a mere innocent approximation that admits a proxy defense in a reductionist context. It not only puts molecular structure by hand, in a way that cannot be derived from quantum mechanics. What the approximation adds to the fundamental theory contradicts this very theory, which supposedly serves as the basis of the reduction.
6.-Conclusions
In this paper we have addressed the problem of the reduction of molecular structure to quantum mechanics from a bottom-up perspective: our aim was to show how the theoretical peculiarities of quantum mechanics stand against the possibility of molecular structure, defined in terms of the spatial relations of the nuclei conceived as individual localized objects. According to the theory, quantum "particles" are not individuals that can be identified as different from others and that can be re-identified through time; therefore, they do not have the ontological stability necessary to maintain the relations that can lead to a spatially definite system with an identifiable shape. On the other hand, although quantum chemists use the resources supplied by quantum mechanics with successful results, this does not mean reduction: their "approximations" add certain assumptions not justified in the context of quantum mechanics or even inconsistent with the very formal structure of the theory.
Of course, these conclusions do not force the abandonment of the ideal of reduction. The insistent reductionist still has two possible strategies. One is to expect the deep revision of chemistry, which in the future would dispense with any concept not perfectly translatable to the underlying quantum theory and, for this reason, considered with no ontological reference. The other is to wait for a replacement of quantum mechanics in its traditional version with another theory better suited to intertheoretic links. One candidate for the replacement is Bohmian 18 mechanics, since it describes a world much closer to the classical ontology; however, this implies to take charge of the widely discussed difficulties of this alternative theory.
On the other hand, for those without a particularly strong reductionist temperament, the arguments developed above serve to support a non-reductionist view of the relations between molecular chemistry and quantum mechanics. In this line there are also different options. For instance, one may consider that the chemical concepts non reducible to physics, such as molecular structure, denote emergent items that, although existentially depending on the underlying physical realm, populate the ontology of chemistry (Hendry 2006 (Hendry , 2010 . Or one may take an ontological pluralist position, according to which chemical concepts refer to items whose existence is guaranteed by the success of chemistry and, therefore, do not need of being referred to a fundamental physical domain (Lombardi and Labarca 2005 , 2006 , Lombardi 2014 ).
Nevertheless, from any of both non-reductionist perspectives, the conceptual fissure between molecular chemistry and quantum mechanics is acknowledged, and it turns out to be clear that it cannot be filled by the traditional reductionist arguments without a deep modification of the disciplines involved in the debate.
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